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Recasting Carried Interest: An Examination of Recent Tax
Reform Proposals
MARGUERITE RACHER SNYDER*
INTRODUCTION
"The nature of investment vehicles is changing right before our eyes, and the tax
code must keep up with the times .. . ."' In the spring of 2007, Senator Baucus's
observation resonated with congressional skepticism toward the favorable tax treatment
of private equity, venture capital, and hedge fund general partners--"money
managers"-who purportedly exploit a "tax loophole the size of a Mack truck."
2
Congress has proposed to more than double the income tax on carried interest-the
payout that fund managers receive when their investments are profitable-to prevent
fund managers from receiving a purported windfall. 3 Tax scholars and politicians have
cited the preferential tax treatment of carried interest as a significant legal loophole
because carried interest superficially resembles the ordinary compensation that school
teachers and corporate executives receive.4 And while school teachers and corporate
executives pay income taxes equaling as much as thirty-five percent of their incomes, a
private equity general partner's carried interest is currently taxed at a low capital gains
rate of fifteen percent,5 allowing him to withhold a significant portion of his lucrative
* J.D. Candidate 2009, Indiana University Maurer School of Law- Bloomington; B.A.
English and Political Science 2004, Emory University. I would like to dedicate this Note to my
husband, Aaron, my parents, Susan and David, and my brother, Matthew. I cannot thank you
enough for your support and encouragement. I would also like to thank Professor William D.
Popkin for his guidance throughout my research on this topic. Lastly, I would like to thank my
Uncle Peter for being an incredible legal mentor to me.
1. News Release, Senate Comm. on Fin., Baucus-Grassley Bill Addresses Publicly Traded
Partnerships 1 (June 14, 2007), available at
http ://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2007/prgO6l4O7d.pdf [hereinafter Committee on Finance
News Release].
2. Jenny Anderson, For Private Investment, The Party Isn't Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2007, at C 1; see Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund
Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CU. L. REV. 1071, 1073 n.4
(2008) (citing to several newspaper articles on the subject of carried interest).
3. See H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). Throughout this
Note, "general partner" denotes the entity, and "fund manager" denotes the individual working
for the general partner.
4. See, e.g., Kevin Drawbaugh, Hillary Clinton Slams Private Equity Tax Loophole,
REUTERS, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/idUSN 1339356720070713
(In a presidential campaign statement, Hillary Clinton said: "It offends our values as a nation
when an investment manager making $50 million can pay a lower tax rate on her earned income
than a teacher making $50,000 pays on her income."); Press Release, U.S. Rep. Sander Levin,
Levin and Democrats Introduce Legislation to End Carried Interest Tax Advantage (June 22,
2007), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/mi12 levin/PR062207.shtml ("These
investment managers are being paid to provide a service to their limited partners and fairness
requires they be taxed at the rates applicable to service income just as any other American
worker.").
5. See 26 U.S.C.A. § l(a)-(e) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (providing the individual income tax
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profits from the federal government. But since this congressional scrutiny arose after a
period of unprecedented success in the buyout industry,6 it is unclear whether fund
managers are truly engaging in "tax arbitrage,, 7 or whether they are simply easy targets
because of their wealth. s Since last year's congressional debate,9 the financial
landscape has changed dramatically. But the issue remains relevant; the Obama
administration has reignited the debate by proposing to raise the tax on carried interest
as part of its budget plan.
l0
This Note assesses whether carried interest, a fund manager's profits interest,
should be taxed at ordinary income rates or maintain its current low capital gains tax
rate. The recent economic downturn has demonstrated the extent to which carried
interest payments are not guaranteed, as private equity firms have suffered tremendous
rates and cost of living adjustments for 2009); 26 U.S.C.A. § 1 (h)(C) (2002 & Supp. 2008)
(providing the capital gains tax rate for 2009); Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107. As a
matter of tax policy, the lower tax rate on capital gains is believed to stimulate investment and
contribute to economic growth. As John F. Kennedy noted in 1963, "[t]he tax on capital gains
directly affects investment decisions, the mobility and flow of risk capital ... the ease or
difficulty experienced by new ventures in obtaining capital, and thereby the strength and
potential for growth in the economy." A Capital Gains Primer, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2007, at
A22, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1 19240927948858793.html; cf AVIVA ARON-
DINE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE "CARRIED INTEREST" CONTROVERSY 10 (2007) (arguing that right of
deferral is a much stronger benefit than the lower tax rate), available at http://www.cbpp.org/7-
31-07tax.pdf.
6. A few years ago, private equity firms experienced tremendous success. The availability
of cheap credit provided fund managers with greater leverage for their deals. Nine out often of
the largest company buyouts occurred between 2006 and 2007 alone. Robert J. Samuelson, The
Private Equity Boom, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at A19, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/14/AR2007031402177.html.
And for the past two decades, these firms have seen average annual returns of 13.2%, whereas
S&P 500 stocks have only averaged 9.7%. Id.; see also Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall Street's Man
of the Moment, FORTUNE, Mar. 5, 2007, at 74, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2007/03/05/8401261/.
7. See Joann M. Weiner, Saving Private Equity, 117 TAx NOTES 309,312 (2007). Eugene
Steuerle, a former Treasury deputy assistant secretary for tax analysis, notes that fund managers
have an incentive to characterize portions of their incomes as capital gains to take advantage of
the preferential tax treatment accorded to capital gains versus ordinary income. Id.
8. Analysts noted that the top twenty-five fund managers make more money in one year
than the CEOs of all of the S&P 500 companies combined. Weiner, supra note 7, at 316. On the
2007 Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans, twenty fund managers are new additions to
the list, each with a net worth of at least $1.3 billion. Id. at 311-12; see The World's Richest
People, FORBES, Mar. 8, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/06/billionaires-new-
richest_07billionaires cz1k af 0308billieintro.html.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE BAR ASs'N TAx SECTION, REPORT ON PROPOSED CARRIED
INTEREST AND FEE DEFERRAL LEGISLATION 17 n.53 (2008) (collecting articles documenting the
debate); Jenny Anderson & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Congress Weighs End to Tax Breakfor Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at Al.
10. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Gillian Wee, Buyout, Hedge Funds Must Reorganize to Avoid
Taxes, Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 23, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=alnrnIYRqwE&refer=news;
Thomas Heath, Investors Bristle at Obama Budget, WASH. POST, Feb. 27,2009 at A08; Andrew
Ross Sorkin, Putting a Bull 's-Eye on a Tax Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2009, at B 1.
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losses resulting from diminished returns. The Senate's proposal to tax all publicly
traded investment partnerships as corporations aptly targets tax-advantaged publicly
traded partnerships, such as Blackstone and Fortress, that have used their "passive
income" to achieve unintended tax advantages." In contrast, the House's broad
proposal to recast carried interest from capital gains into ordinary compensation is
overly punitive and misguided. 12 The responsibilities undertaken and capital
contributed by many investment partnerships that utilize the carried interest fee
structure embody the types of capital risks that the current legal regime taxes at a
preferential rate. 
13
Part I examines the tax benefits associated with using a partnership structure, and
how private equity and venture capital general partners are able to achieve substantial
tax savings. Part II addresses the arguments for and against taxing carried interest at
ordinary income rates. Part III examines the unintended tax benefits achieved by
publicly traded partnerships such as Blackstone. This Note concludes that attempts to
frame carried interest tax policy as an "either/or" proposition are ill-conceived, and the
proper legislative approach to taxing carried interest must recognize that it embodies
both ordinary income and capital gain.
I. BACKGROUND: THE TAX BENEFITS OF CARRIED INTEREST AND THE PARTNERSHIP
STRUCTURE
Private equity funds and hedge funds, commonly referred to as "alternative
investment vehicles," have become popular among many institutional investors, such as
universities, pension funds, and wealthy individuals. 14 Despite their success in
11. The Blackstone Group LP (http://www.blackstone.com) and Fortress Investment Group
LLC (http://www.fortressinv.coml) are two previously private investment partnerships that
subsequently took their firms public. The ease with which both firms recategorized significant
portions of income by shifting it through blocker entities illustrates how treating carried interest
as a capital gain, which consequently qualifies it as "passive income" under the publicly traded
partnership statute, is problematic. See Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89
(2008); Lee A. Sheppard, Blackstone Proves CarriedInterests Can Be Valued, 115 TAX NOTES
1236, 1239-40 (2007); Susan Beck, The Transformers, AM. LAw., Nov. 2007, at 94, 96.
12. To a large extent, the debate in Congress seems to be more focused on raising federal
revenues than achieving fairness in the tax code. See Sarah Lueck, Two Tax Proposals Target
Wealthy Fund Managers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2007, at A12, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 119328131658070972.html (supporting an income tax increase
on private equity and hedge fund managers, whose tax increase in carried interest would raise an
estimated $25.6 billion in revenue over ten years).
13. Many venture capitalist general partners have contended that the manner in which they
earn their carried interest differs from the manner in which private equity and hedge fund
general partners earn their carried interest because they undertake more capital risks. See, e.g.,
Carried Interest Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing07ll07.htm [hereinafter Carried Interest
Part I] (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners).
14. See MARK JICKLING & DONALD J. MARPLEs, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: TAXATION OF
HEDGE FuND AND PRrVATE EQuITY MANAGERS 2 (2007), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22689_20070705.pdf; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT
LAw AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND
20091 1451
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generating significant investment returns' 5 for their investors, their commensurate
success in generating astronomically high profits for themselves has drawn public
scrutiny. Their astonishingly high net worths have prompted some to liken fund
managers such as Henry Kravis and Stephen Schwartzman16 to the robber barons of the
Gilded Age.17 While the level of public attention to the issue of carried interest taxation
has declined since the onset of the economic slowdown of 2008, the debate that began
in 2007 will likely be revived under Barack Obama's administration.1
8
Using the partnership structure, fund managers have been able to reap the benefits
of the lower capital gains tax rate of fifteen percent on their carried interest, a
significant source of their profits, while essentially performing services that some have
argued are substantially similar to those performed by entities that are taxed at higher
corporate tax rates. 19 Certain fund managers who have taken their management
partnerships public have achieved further tax savings by structuring the initial public
offering (IPO) to avoid disadvantageous high corporate tax rates2° and double
taxation.21 This Part discusses the tax benefits accorded to a fund manager whose entity
operates as a partnership and utilizes a carried interest fee structure. A partner receives
many tax benefits at the outset when the partnership is formed and throughout the
ongoing business of the fund partnership. Since the general partners' relationship with
the limited partners is created by private contract, the general partners have the
flexibility to devise terms that are favorable to them by recharacterizing fees in a tax-
friendly way.
RELATED ISSUES, PART 1, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-41-07.pdf
[hereinafter PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS PART I].
15. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 309 (discussing the high rate of return for private equity
investors); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Of Private Equity, Politics and Income Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2007, § 3, at 37, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/1 l/business/yourmoney/1 ldeal.html.
16. Henry Kravis, the co-founder of the firm Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts Co., and Steve
Schwarzman, the head of the private equity firm Blackstone, have been vilified by the media, as
many believe that they both exemplify excessive wealth and lavish lifestyles made possible by
the lower capital gains taxes that they pay on a majority of their incomes. See, e.g., Raging Bull:
Steve Schwarzman Declares the Dawn of a New Golden Age for Private Equity, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 8, 2008, at 84.
17. Richard Rubin & Clea Benson, Private Equity Firms: A Matter of Some Interest, CQ
WKLY., July 16, 2007, at 2104.
18. See Donmoyer & Wee, supra note 10.
19. The top corporate tax rate is thirty-five percent, and this tax rate applies to private
equity and venture capital general partners. See, e.g., William L. Watts, Rep. Rangel Proposes
AMT Repeal, Corporate Tax-Rate Cut, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 25, 2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/rep-rangel-proposes-amt-
repeal/story.aspx?guid--/-7BC865D786%2D4883%2D454F%2DA2A3%2DOE1 9F70AB094
%7D&dist=-msr_8.
20. Blackstone and Fortress executed high profile initial public stock offerings. Through
creative lawyering and tax planning, the firms were able to simultaneously avoid paying the
higher corporate tax rate and avoid regulation under the Investment Company Act. See Beck,
supra note 11, at 110.
21. "Double taxation" refers to the imposition of two taxes on corporate profits-once to
the corporation when the profits are earned and once to the shareholders when the earnings are
distributed as dividends. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1500 (8th ed. 2004).
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A. Carried Interest and the Current Fee Structure
A carried interest is "a right to receive a percentage of fund profits without an
obligation to contribute a corresponding share of the financial capital of the fund.,
22
The term originated with the idea that the investors "carry" the investment by
contributing most of the capital and by bearing the burden of a failed investment by not
being able to seek recourse through the fund manager's personal assets.2 1 Carried
interest is currently taxed at the capital gains rate of fifteen percent rather than the
ordinary income rate of thirty-five percent 24 because of the risk that the fund managers
assume when they invest capital in uncertain markets.25
The carried interest is identified as each fund manager's "profits interest," or future
interest in the profits of the partnership.26 A fund manager is not taxed upon receiving
his or her right to a portion of the profits derived from the sale of a portfolio company
or other investment.2 7 Rather, a carried interest is taxed when individual fund managers
realize it,28 and the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") treats the income as a capital
gain rather than an ordinary income distribution.29
The Code identifies a capital gain when a capital asset,30 such as a stock or bond, is
sold at a price higher than the asset's basis.31 If a fund manager holds a capital asset for
22. ARoN-DINE, supra note 5, at 4; see also PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note
14, at 2.
23. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (2008). In the early 1980s it was simple for the investors to
provide fund managers with a nonrecourse loan equivalent to twenty percent of the contributed
capital and bear "the cost of capital" by not charging interest on the loan. Id. at 21; see JACK S.
LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, PRIVATE EQUITY, AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
TRANSACTIONS 1002.4, at 10-10 (2002) (noting how partnerships previously allocated eighty
percent of the profit in accordance with the amount of capital contributed, "without offset for
losses on unsuccessful deals and fund expenses (including management fees)"); Ntel B.
Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The Carried Interest Controversy: Let's Not Get Carried
Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121, 128 n.41 (2008) (discussing how a fund's investors bear the losses
when the investments decrease in value). As discussed later on in this Note, the interest-free
arrangement would no longer be feasible under I.R.C. § 7872 (2006).
24. The top marginal income tax rate is currently thirty-five percent. I.R.C. § l(i)(2) (2006).
25. The investment risk has traditionally been likened to an "entrepreneurial risk." See
David A. Weisbach, Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation Is Misguided, 116 TANOTES
505,508 (2007).
26. Upon the formation of a partnership, the partners' interests in the partnership are
subdivided into capital interests and profits interests. See discussion infra Part I.B.
27. See Weisbach, supra note 25, at 506.
28. A realization event is a transaction that converts noncash assets into cash assets and
"substantially changes a taxpayer's economic position so that income tax may be imposed or a
tax allowance granted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1292 (8th ed. 2004).
29. Many have noted that fund managers enjoy two tax benefits with their carried interest:
timing, whereby the partner is not required to recognize income upon its receipt of a profits
interest, and character, whereby the partner's share of investment proceeds is taxed at the lower
capital gains rate when its share of partnership capital gain is attributed to it. See, e.g., Carried
Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office, at
7-11).
30. See I.RC. § 1221(a) (2006).
31. See Kathy Krawczyk & Lorraine Wright, Dividends and Capital Gains Planning After
2009] 1453
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one year or less, the Code deems the gain a short-term capital gain and taxes it at
ordinary income rates.3 2 However, if the fund manager holds the capital asset for
longer than one year and sells it for a profit, the profit is a long-term capital gain and is
taxed at a lower rate of fifteen percent.33 The fund managers of private equity and
venture capital funds are able to keep a significant portion of their incomes because
many of their portfolio company holdings are held over a period of several years,
qualifying their carried interests for long-term capital gains treatment.34 As a capital
gain, the carried interest not only has the benefit of a lower tax rate than that of
ordinary income, but it also has the benefit of deferral since it is not taxed until it is
realized.35
Ordinary income, on the other hand, consists of "any gain from the sale or exchange
of property" which is neither classified as a capital asset nor classified as property in
accordance with § 123 1(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. 36 Individuals have a strong
incentive to classify income that the Code would ordinarily tax as ordinary income as
capital gains because of the difference between the two tax rates.37 The statutory
definition of a capital asset provides a series of exceptions, which enables all property
that does not fall into one of the enumerated statutory categories to qualify as capital.38
While the carried interest amount earned by private equity general partners is
substantial, typically amounting to twenty percent of the fund's profits, it is never
guaranteed.39 Many partnership agreements subject the carried interest to a "hurdle
rate," which requires the general partners to return the limited partners' capital
contribution plus a certain percentage of the fund's profits before the general partners
are entitled to their percentage. a° Moreover, carried interest distributions are often
subject to a clawback provision, whereby a partner in receipt of fund profits after the
sale of a portfolio company must subsequently give back a portion of a profit earned if
the 2003 Tax Act, CPA J., Oct. 2004, at 36, 36, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2004/1004/essentials/p36.htm.
32. See I.R.C. § 1222 (1) (2006).
33. Seeid.
34. Jack Levin notes that under the industry standard, each fund has a ten to twelve year
life. See LEVIN, supra note 23, 1005, at 10-13.
35. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, at 8-9). The benefit of deferral has been significant for hedge fund
managers, who can accumulate tax-free investment returns over an extended period of time by
holding their profits in foreign-chartered funds. See JICKLING & MARPLES, supra note 14, at 3.
However, a recent revision to I.R.C. § 457A put an end to this by preventing offshore hedge
fund managers from deferring fee income for services performed after 2008. See Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, tit. VIII, § 801, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3929
(2008) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 457A).
36. I.R.C. § 64 (2006).
37. See Timothy R. Koski, A New Twist to the Substitute-for-Ordinary Income Doctrine:
Third Circuit Adopts "Family Resemblance" Test to Characterize Sale ofLottery Proceeds as
Ordinary Income, 83 N.D. L. REV. 27, 28 (2007).
38. See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(l)-(8) (2006).
39. Andrew Kirkpatrick, Note, The Shield of "Unintended Consequences": Analyzing
Venture Capital's Defense Against Increased CarriedInterest Taxation, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 483, 488 (2008).
40. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 24. Eight percent is a fairly common hurdle rate. See
Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 78 (2005) [hereinafter
Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return].
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the overall profit goal was not achieved.4' In recent months, the economic downturn
has stirred anxiety in hedge fund investors, who have responded to low investment
returns by requesting redemptions on their capital.42 The effect of the influx of the
redemption requests forced many funds to sell many assets, which consequently
lowered the profits.
In addition to providing for a carried interest, the general partners charge the limited
partners a management fee equivalent to approximately two percent of the assets under
management regardless of whether the underlying investments are profitable.43 This
amount is taxed at the ordinary income rate of thirty-five percent." Since the partners
are able to set the terms of their compensation by contract, the fees that the general
partners charge the limited partners are somewhat amorphous. Fund managers often
convert their management fees into carried interest in the form of a "fee waiver"
whereby they increase their distributive share in the fund's gains rather than charging a
management fee.45 For instance, a general partner could decrease its management fee to
one percent and increase its carried interest to 26.7% in a $1 billion investment fund
that originally had a two percent management fee and twenty percent carried interest.46
Whereas the general partner would have originally owed $11.5 million in taxes, by
recharacterizing a portion of its management fee into carried interest, the general
partner reduces the amount it owes in taxes by $2 million.47
B. Tax Benefits of Partnership Structure-Formation
The relationship between fund managers and their investors is usually structured as
a limited partnership or limited liability company under state law.48 As the fund's
41. See Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, supra note 40, at 85. As Fleischer
discusses in his article, if a limited partner invests $100 in a ten-year private equity fund, and the
contract provides for an eight percent hurdle rate that is compounded annually, the limited
partner must receive $216 before the general partner can take any carried interest. If the fund's
combination of profits and losses yields an overall five percent return, the general partner would
receive one percent of the return as carried interest. Id.
42. See Hedge Funds Anxious as Redemption Deadline Looms, N.Y. Times' DealBook
Blog, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/hedge-funds-anxious-as-redempfion-deadline-
looms/?scp=l&sq=Hedge%20Funds%20Anxious%20as%20Redemption%20Deadline%20Looms
&st--cse (Nov. 14, 2008, 7:24 EST).
43. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 3.
44. See Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, supra note 40, at 109.
45. See Sheppard, supra note 11, at 1241 (noting that this "gimmick" has become a popular
way for fund managers to lower their taxes). The ease with which fund managers recharacterize
their income from being a portion of a management fee to being a portion of their carried
interest has been cited as a reason why carried interest more closely resembles compensation for
services rather than a capital gain from an investment. See CarriedInterest Part I, supra note 13
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office, at 6).
46. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, at 11).
47. Id. Fund investors have criticized this practice, fearing that higher management fees will
make fund managers less inclined to make profitable investments. See Tennille Tracy, It's the
Fees, Not the Profits, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2007, at Cl.
48. Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, supra note 40, at 82.
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general partners, the fund managers devise and implement investment strategies,
providing mostly intellectual, rather than monetary, capital. 4 9 The general partners
contribute a nominal one-to-five percent of the monetary capital and generate the
remainder of the capital from the investors. 50 The individuals working for the general
partner usually have several years of experience working on Wall Street, and some of
them have even worked as Secretary of the Treasury or Chairman of the SEC.5 The
investors, usually public institutions or wealthy individuals, become limited partners
and commit capital to the fund.
52
When the partnership is formed, each partner receives interests that can be
conceptually divided into capital interests and profits interests. 53 A capital interest
entitles the partner to a portion of the value derived from the sale of the partnership's
assets for fair market value upon its liquidation.5 4 The capital account measures the
value of the assets that the partner contributes to the partnership, plus his distributive
share of income, minus his distributive share of losses and the value of the distributions
that he received. 55 The partner's receipt of a capital interest is considered to be a
taxable event,56 and under Treasury Regulation section 1.721-1(b)(1) it is taxed as
ordinary compensation. However, the IRS does not treat a profits interest that an
individual receives "for the benefit of a partnership in a partner capacity or in
anticipation of being a partner . . . as a taxable event for the partner or the
partnership., 57 The profits interest is only loosely defined as being "a partnership
interest other than a capital interest., 5 8 A fund manager's right to receive his or her
carried interest is considered to be a partnership profits interest in the investment fund
partnership, and therefore it is not taxable upon receipt.
59
The issue of whether a general partner's future profits interest should be deemed
taxable upon receipt was heavily disputed in the early 1990s. In Diamond v.
49. See id.
50. See id. One percent was previously required as a capital contribution for the entity to
qualify as a partnership for tax purposes prior to the enactment of the check-the-box rules. See
id. at 82 n.25.
51. See JICKLING & MARPLES, supra note 14, at 3. As Weisbach notes, the fund managers'
firms have "expertise, contacts, deal flow, valuation systems, methods of managing companies,
and other intangibles that potentially allow it to profit ... " See Weisbach, supra note 25, at
505.
52. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO TAX
TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS AND RELATED ISSUES, PART II, at 2 (2007),
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-41-07.pdf.
53. See id. at 5.
54. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
55. See I.R.C. § 702(b) (2006).
56. I.R.C. § 83 (2006).
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (as amended in 1996).
58. See Rev. Proc. 93-27.
59. See Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191; Rev. Proc. 93-27. Carried interest is
considered to be a profits interest in the fund partnership, rather than a capital interest, because
its value is uncertain when it is received and it is not measured in terms of a partner's
contribution. Weisbach, supra note 25, at 505. In Campbell v. Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit
noted that a profits interest refers to a right to share in profits and losses rather than the capital
assets of the partnership. 943 F.2d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Commissioner,60 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision to treat the
receipt of a profits interest as a taxable event if the interest had a "determinable market
value.",6 1 Several years later, in Campbell v. Commissioner, the Eighth Circuit held that
the receipt of a partnership profits interest did not have an ascertainable value for tax
purposes. 62 In Campbell, the taxpayer argued that a service partner (one whose
partnership interest is given in exchange for services provided to the partnership) who
receives a profits interest does not realize income upon receiving that interest. 63 The
court held that a service partner should not be taxed upon receiving his profits interest
in the partnership because the future performance of a limited partnership was
unpredictable, and therefore the profits interest did not have a fair market value.64 The
Campbell holding created an unintended opportunity for taxpayers to characterize
portions of income received as compensation for services as capital gains income.65 As
a result of Campbell, the receipt of a profits interest by a partner performing services
for the partnership is not treated as a taxable event.66 Scholars note that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to tax a carried interest at the time of its receipt because its
value is uncertain.67
C. Tax Benefits of Partnership Structure-Ongoing Business
The partnership structure is desirable because it provides several tax benefits.
Unlike corporations, partnerships are pass-through entities. 68 The character of the gains
realized by the partnership passes through to partners as though realized by each
individual partner.69 When a partnership makes a distribution, the partner is not
required to recognize70 that gain or loss,71 nor is he required to pay tax on a
60. 492 F.2d 286 (1974).
61. Id. at 290. See generally Weisbach, supra note 25.
62. See Campbell, 943 F.2d at 823.
63. Id. at 818.
64. See id. at 823.
65. See Henry M. Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 323, 360 (2007).
66. See Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
67. See Fair and Equitable Tax Policy for America's Working Families: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute and Former Director at the Cong. Budget Office),
available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode--view&id=7144
[hereinafter Fair and Equitable]. But see Sheppard, supra note 11, at 1240 (arguing that all
partnership profits interests should be taxable upon receipt).
68. See I.R.C. § 702 (2006). Income, regardless of whether or not it is distributed to the
partners, is taxed to the partners. Under the "Check-The-Box Classification Rules," a domestic
partnership is taxed as a partnership unless it elects to be taxed as a corporation. See LEVIN,
supra note 23 302.8.1, at 3-20.
69. See PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 36.
70. A recognition event is different from a realization event. It is "[t]he act or an instance of
accounting for a taxpayer's realized gain or loss for the purpose of income-tax reporting."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (8th ed. 2004). A realization event is "[a]n event or transaction,
such as the sale or exchange of property, that substantially changes a taxpayer's economic
position so that income tax may be imposed or a tax allowance granted." Id at 1292.
71. SeeI.R.C. § 731(b) (2006).
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contribution to the partnership.72 The partners are free to allocate profits and losses in
the partnership agreement in any manner that they choose.73
Victor Fleischer, a law professor whose research on carried interest is believed by
many to be responsible for initiating the policy debate in Congress, testified before
Congress and expressed his belief that a partnership profits interest is "the single most
tax-efficient form of compensation available without limitation to highly-paid
executives. 74 To illustrate its efficiency, Fleischer compared a fund manager's receipt
of a partnership profits interest to a corporate executive's receipt of restricted corporate
stock. When a corporate executive receives a restricted stock grant, he has the choice
of recognizing income immediately on the current value of the property by making a §
83(b) election, making any further gain or loss on the stock a capital gain or loss,76 or
electing to "wait-and-see," making any further gain taxable as ordinary income.
77
However, private equity and venture capital general partners are not required to make a
choice. They are simply permitted to benefit from deferring recognition of their gains
and losses, and upon realization, their profits are taxed at the preferential capital gains
rate. 
78
Moreover, a general partner's carried interest is conceptually similar to the
incentive stock options (ISOs) of corporate executives.79 With ISOs, preferential tax
treatment is only permitted on up to $100,000 worth of stock.80 However, the general
partner's carried interest is not similarly limited to a specific dollar amount.
8 1
72. See I.R.C. § 721 (2006) (noting certain exceptions).
73. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-503 (2005).
74. Fair and Equitable, supra note 67 (statement of Victor Fleischer, Associate Professor,
University of Illinois College of Law, at 3).
75. See id.; see also Michael S. Knoll, The Section 83(b) Electionfor Restricted Stock: A
Joint Tax Perspective, 59 SMU L. REv. 721,722 (2006) (noting that restricted stock is granted
to employees as a portion of their compensation).
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2(a) (1978). Michael Knoll provides further elaboration in his
paper:
If the employee makes [a § 83(b)] election, she includes in her ordinary income for
the tax year... the market value of the stock.., as of the grant date less any
payments she made for the stock. The employee then has a basis in her shares
equal to the grant price, and any subsequent gain or loss is capital and taxed upon
realization.
Knoll, supra note 75, at 723.
77. See Fair and Equitable, supra note 67 (statement of Victor Fleischer, Associate
Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, at 3). See generally Knoll, supra note 75
(discussing the tax implications of receiving corporate stock for both the employer and the
employee).
78. See Fair and Equitable, supra note 67 (statement of Victor Fleiscber, Associate
Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, at 3).
79. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 25-26.
80. See id. at 26; see also I.R.C. § 422(d) (2006).
81. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 26.
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D. A Narrow Tax Benefit For Publicly Traded Partnerships
Private partnerships that later become publicly traded are also able to reap
significant tax benefits. A publicly traded partnership is a limited partnership whose
interests are traded on an established securities market, secondary securities market, or
a substantial equivalent to one of the two.8 2 Current law treats publicly traded
partnerships as corporations for tax purposes, subjecting them to a thirty-five percent
income tax with two exceptions. One exception applies to partnerships that derive at
least ninety percent of their gross income from passive investments, including
dividends, interest, rents, and capital gains.83 These types of investments are identified
in I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1) as "qualifying income. ' ' 4 A second grandfather clause exception
allows general partners in partnerships that traded publicly as offDecember 17, 1987 to
be taxed at the lower capital gains rate, as they would be under the law's prior
treatment.
85
II. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EFFORTS TO TAX CARRIED INTEREST AS
ORDINARY INCOME
The significant tax savings that fund managers have been able to achieve due to the
low tax rate on carried interest and the unintended loophole for publicly traded
partnerships under section 7704 sparked a politically polarizing debate in Congress in
2007.86 Congress proposed two bills aimed at increasing the income tax rate for
investment management partnership income.87 Congress sought to prevent unintended
opportunities for many already-wealthy fund managers to significantly augment their
incomes. 8 According to a study published in 2008, Congress would be able to raise an
additional two to three billion dollars by increasing the income tax rate for fund
manager profits.8 9 While the utility of raising additional federal revenues is apparent, in
the short term these potential revenues are limited by the fact that private equity deal-
making is at a standstill. 9° The diminished returns on private equity investments will
82. See LEviN, supra note 23, 302.8.3, at 3-22.
83. JICKLING & MARPLEs, supra note 14, at 5.
84. I.R.C. § 7704(d)(1) (2006).
85. JICKLING & MARPLES, supra note 14, at 5 n.9.
86. See Kevin Drawbaugh, Bush Says 'Hesitant'on Private Equity Tax Issue, INT'L Bus.
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2007, available at http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/20070809/private-equity-
tax_all.htm; see also Ryan J. Donmoyer & Alison Fitzgerald, Schumer Says He 'll Sponsor Tax
Rise on Fund Managers (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 3, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aG.b8SM8Gvc4&refer-home.
87. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
88. See PRESENT LAw AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 24.
89. See Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation ofPrivate Equity CarriedInterests: Estimating The
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests As Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115,
139 (2008). Knoll notes, however, the strong likelihood that transactional structures will change
in response to changes in the tax law. Id. at 149-57; see also Ryan J. Donmoyer, Buyout Firm
Tax Boost Won't Raise Revenue, Study Says (Update 2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 22, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aFTZWOQ3BEzg&refer=home.
90. David Marchick, a managing director of the Carlyle Group, recently commented that the
environment has changed dramatically since the carried interest debate was initiated in 2007.
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mean less carried interest for general partners.91 When the issue is revisited by Barack
Obama's administration, it will be important to draft a legislative solution that is
consistent with the tax code and that recognizes the economic relationship between the
limited partners and the general partners.
A. The Preferential Treatment of General Partner Carried Interests
H.R. 2834 (the "Levin Bill"), introduced by Congressman Sander M. "Sandy"
Levin (D-Mich.) on June 22,2007,92 was a broad measure that sought to recast carried
interest from capital gain to ordinary income. The Levin Bill never became law, but
since its introduction, Congress has revisited the issue when it attempted to pass H.R.
3970, 93 and subsequently H.R. 6275, 94 which passed in the House on June 25, 2008.
95
If enacted into law, the tax increase on carried interest would significantly affect
private equity and venture capital firms and their partners in light of their substantial
reliance on carried interest profits. These firms seek "speculative situation[s] with
substantial opportunit[ies] for value enhancement if the business succeeds ...."96
While both types of firms utilize the investment partnership structure, each engages in
a different sort of investment strategy to achieve its goals.
97
Private equity funds manage approximately $1 trillion globally, with an estimated
$374 billion in assets under management concentrated among the thirteen largest
funds. 98 These firms generally purchase privately held securities. They frequently
"It's shifted because there is no carry. Look at Blackstone's earnings. People can't do deals, and
that affects carry." Dealmakers Discuss a Potential Carried-Interest Tax Hike in 2009, Posting
of George White to Dealscape,
http://www.thedeal.com/dealscape/2008/1 1/dealmakers discuss_a_potential.php (Nov. 12,
2008, 12:32 EST).
91. See Obama Victory May Revive Buyout Tax Debate, N.Y Times' DealBook Blog,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/obama-victory-may-revive-buyout-tax-
debate/?scp=1&sq=Obama%20Victory/o20May/o20Revive%20Buyout/o20Tax%20Debate%
20&st=cse (Nov. 6, 2008, 11:11 EST).
92. H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. (2007).
93. H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. (2007). This is a broader measure that was passed by the House
and largely intended to generate revenue to eliminate the alternative minimum tax.
94. H.R. 6275, 110th Cong. (2008).
95. 154 CONG. REc. H6044 (daily ed. June 25, 2008).
96. See LEVIN, supra note 23, 104, at 1-6.
97. While hedge funds are also impacted by the legislation, the tax issues that pertain to
hedge funds will not be discussed in this Note, because many hedge fund holdings constitute
short-term capital gains and are thus taxed as ordinary income. Hedge funds generally engage in
financial arbitrage, investing in liquid assets in an attempt to make a profit from pricing mistakes
in capital markets. See PRESENT LAw AND ANALYSIs PART I, supra note 14, at 9. While some
seek to profit from taking "speculative positions" on the future value of stocks, bonds,
commodities, and other financial assets, others design portfolios that span several different asset
classes and markets in the hopes of gaining an overall profit. See id,
98. PREsENT LAW AND ANALYsIS PART I, supra note 14, at 16. As Peter Orszag relates in his
congressional testimony, the private equity market is dominated by a small group of key firms
who together have raised an average of thirty billion dollars in capital over the past five years.
See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget
Office, at 4).
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purchase stakes in companies with the hope of restructuring them.99 The general
partners and limited partners usually agree to an investment period of five to seven
years and a partnership term often to twelve years.1°°
In recent years, leveraged buyouts (LBOs) have been a popular private equity
investment strategy.' 0' In a LBO, the general partners provide management and
contribute equity to the purchase of a business. 0 2 The remainder of the business's
purchase price is funded by bank loans with the company's assets functioning as loan
collateral. 10 3 Contrary to the "buy-and-bust" strategy that was popular in the 1980s,
firms are more frequently pursuing a "buy-and-build" strategy, which involves
consolidating small entities to create a larger entity equaling "more than the sum of its
parts."'' 1 4 While the buyout market thrived from 2003 until 2007 thanks to a favorable
economic climate and the widespread availability of cheap debt, 05 the recent credit
crisis has largely halted private equity LBOs as financing has withered.'
6
Venture capital funds, like private equity funds, collect capital from limited
partners. However, their target companies are typically early stage companies.10 7 Once
the general and limited partners form a venture capital fund, the general partners
identify and invest in innovative industries, seeking to fund entrepreneurial activity.108
For companies seeking to expand their business, the general partners provide capital,
market expertise, and management with the goal of selling the companies at a profit or
profiting through an initial public stock offering.109 Only about twenty percent of all
venture capital investments generate realizable gains.' 0 Venture capital partnerships
managed approximately $236 billion in assets in 2006."'
99. See Carried Interest Part 1, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, at 3).
100. See DAVID M. TOLL, PRIVATE EQurrY PRIMER, at vi (2005), available at
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/publi/documents/sba-programoffice/inv-primer.pdf.
101. Seeid.atii.
102. See id. at iii.
103. Id. atii.
104. Id.
105. See HEINO MEERKATT & HEINRICH LIECHTENSTEIN, GET READY FOR THE NEXT PRIVATE
EQUITY SHAKEOUT: WILL THIS BE THE NEXT SHOCK TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY? 1 (2008),
available at http://www.bcg.com/impactexpertise/publications/files/GetReady PrivateEquity_
Shakeout Dec 2008.pdf, James Mawson, Buyout-Firm FailureRate Will Top 201, Study Says, WALL
ST. J. EUROPE, Dec. 22, 2008, at 25.
106. See Michael J. de la Merced, Buyout Industry, Once Booming, Staggers Under Weight
of Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008, at AI.
107. Venture capital is defined as "[flunds invested in a new enterprise that has high risk and
the potential for a high return." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (8th ed. 2004).
108. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 39, at 485-86.
109. See id. 485-86.
110. Id. at487.
111. Posting to Global Entrepreneurship Institute Blog,
http://blog.gcase.org/archives/363 (Jan. 16, 2008, 17:16 PST). Venture capital firms have
contended that they should not be grouped together with hedge funds and private equity firms,
and assert that the proposed legislation should not apply to them. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A
Professor's Word on a Buyout Tax Battle, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 2007, http:/www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/03/business/03tax.html?pagewanted=2&sq=buyout-tax&st=nyt&scp=l.
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1. Ordinary Income v. Capital Gain
The principal legal question in the carried interest debate concerns its identity. More
specifically, Congress must determine whether its attributes make it taxable as
compensation for services performed, or whether it is truly a gain from a capital
investment. " 1
2
Congress has long maintained a purposeful difference between the tax rates for
ordinary income and capital gains. The preferential tax treatment accorded to capital
gains flows from the nature of the underlying business activity. A capital investment
that results in a gain more closely resembles an entrepreneurial or investment risk than
labor."13 The lower rate also encourages investors to subject their capital to market
fluctuation. Maintaining a lower capital gains tax rate reduces what has been described
as "the lock-in" effect-essentially, a phenomenon where investors hesitate to sell their
appreciated assets due to a higher tax rate on their sale.
14
Proponents of the Levin Bill have contended that taxing carried interest at a higher
rate would be consistent with the Code because a carried interest is akin to a
performance bonus. 15 Therefore, carried interest resembles other similar forms of
compensation taxed at ordinary income rates, such as sales commissions designed to
align the incentives of employees with those of their employers." 6 Characterizing a
carried interest as a capital gain is believed to distort the reality of the general partner's
role in the transaction. If a lower tax rate on capital gains exists already, policymakers
have little reason to "reward" the risk-taking of a fund manager who "contribute[s] to
economic activity" rather than risks its own capital." 17 Under this view, the preferential
tax treatment is misplaced because a fund manager's work more closely resembles that
of a corporate executive or money manager rather than one who invests his own
capital. Therefore, those who support the Levin proposal seek to maintain preferential
112. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, at 10); PRESENT LAW & ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 8.
113. See Weisbach, supra note 25, at 507; cf Carried Interest Part II. Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing073107.htm [hereinafter Carried Interest Part I1]
(statement of Joseph Bankman, Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law
School, at 4).
114. See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 137; see also Newt Gingrich, Speaker of
the House, Remarks at the Cato Institute's Should We Lower the Capital Gains Tax? Policy
Forum (July 16, 1998), in CATO POL'Y RvT. Sept-Oct 1998, at 6, 6, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy report/v20n5/capgains.pdf("When people sell capital, the sale
represents unlocking money to go from a less productive investment to a more productive
investment ... ").
115. It is likened to a "performance-related bonus" in Editorial, The Fair Way to Tax Private
Equity, FIN. TIMES (London), July 18,2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4f233e38-355e- 11 dc-
bb 1 6-0000779fd2ac.html.
116. Id.
117. LILY BATCHELDER, DANA CHASIN, JONATHAN C. GOLDSTEIN & HEATHER SLAvKIN,
ADDRESSING OBJECTIONS TO H.R. 2834-THE LEVIN CARRIED INTEREST BILL 2 (2007), available
at http://www.ombwatch.org/files/budget/addrobjectionstocarriedinterestbil.pdf (citing Carried
Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Cong. Budget Office)).
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tax treatment for profits related to a fund manager's invested capital, or capital
interests, and tax any remaining unrelated profits (primarily carried interest) as
ordinary income.'"
8
Supporters also contend that it is inequitable and economically inefficient to tax
people at different rates based on their choices of profession." 9 They argue that the
lower tax rate harms the economy by "distort[ing] career choice[s]" of capable
individuals who decide not to pursue a corporate executive position because of the tax
"subsidy" these individuals would receive by working for a private equity or venture
capital firm instead. 120 Proponents of eliminating the preferential tax treatment argue
that the lower tax rate is misplaced because a fund manager's work more closely
resembles that of a corporate executive or money manager rather than one who invests
his own capital. 121 They also assert that taxing carried interest at the lower capital gains
rate encourages general partners to intentionally and improperly characterize income as
carried interest rather than ordinary performance fees. 122 They note that the U.S. tax
code should not extend fund managers a lifeline to help them stay afloat.
123
Opponents of the carried interest legislation point out that carried interest is in fact
different from other forms of employee compensation because its receipt is contingent
upon the overall performance of its portfolio companies.' 24 Carried interest therefore
cannot be likened to a form of ordinary employee compensation, such as a stock
option, because of the inherent risk involved. 25 While the recipient of a stock option is
only subject to the upside of the company's performance, a general partner who
receives a carried interest maintains an equity stake in the fund.126 When the stock
market plunges as it has in recent months, the general profits interests suffer.'
27
118. See H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. § 710(c)(2) (as introduced to the House, June 22,2007);
Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 125-26.
119. See BATCHELDER ET AL., supra note 117, at 3; Selwyn Parker, When Private Equity
Players Are Paying 'Less Tax Than a Cleaning Lady, the Question Is: Are We Being Taken to
the Cleaners?, SUNDAY HERALD (Scotland), June 23, 2007, available at
http://www.sundayherald.com/business/businessnews/display.var. 1494212.0.when_private
equityplayersarepayingless tax than a cleaningladythequestion is are we being_
taken to the cleaners.php.
120. See CarriedInterest Part II, supra note 113 (statement of Joseph Bankman, Ralph M.
Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, at 1).
121. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, at 9-10).
122. Peter Orszag notes that "22 percent of total current-year long-term capital gains
reported on individual income tax returns" were capital gains from partnerships and S
corporations in 2005. Id. at 4.
123. See Weiner, supra note 7, at 317.
124. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing
Director, Scale Venture Partners, at 11).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 10.
127. In the spring of 2008, reputable fund managers incurred multi-billion dollar losses on
their investments. Steve Schwarzman of Blackstone personally lost $3.9 billion as Blackstone's
stock price sank. See de la Merced, supra note 106.
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Furthermore, a general partner is subject to partnership taxation rules that require
the partners to report a combination of their income, gain, losses, and expenses on their
annual tax returns. Any losses would be characterized as capital losses, which
taxpayers may only use to offset capital gains plus $3000 of ordinary income in the
current year, 12 or carry forward to future years. 129 If there is an early gain from the sale
of a portfolio company and a later loss, the partner will lose the tax benefit of the
carried interest, 130 since offsetting losses can only be deducted against future capital
gains.'
3 1
Most importantly, fund managers cannot easily confine a carried interest to a single
category of income because it possesses aspects of both ordinary compensation and
investment risk.' 32 As David Weisbach notes, the labor of a fund manager is similar to
that of an ordinary investor who purchases stock through a margin account-a
transaction that entails combining personal and third-party capital with labor. Current
tax law does not attempt to isolate the labor component of the investor's gains. 133
Therefore, it would be arbitrary to premise the rationale for taxing carried interest at
ordinary income rates or as capital gains on the presence or absence of labor in a fund
manager's day-to-day management responsibilities.1
3 4
128. See I.R.C. § 1211 (b) (2006). It should be noted that capital losses are less favorable
than ordinary losses, which can be deducted against ordinary income, which itself is taxed at a
higher rate. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 62(a)(3) (2006) (providing that adjusted gross income consists of
gross income minus several different types of deductions, including losses incurred from the sale
or exchange of property); id. § 165(a) (providing that individual losses shall be allowed as a
deduction); Ray A. Knight, Lee G. Knight & Brian Sellers, Abandoning a Partnership Interest:
Is the Loss Ordinary or Capital?, CPA J., Mar. 1994, at 16, 16, available at
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/old/15328443.htm.
129. See I.R.C. § 1212(b) (2006) (providing that any unused capital losses may be carried
forward to later years, but not back to prior years); see also Cunningham & Engler, supra note
23, at 129 n.46.
130. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of Kate D. Mitchell, Managing
Director, Scale Venture Partners, at 10-11).
131. See id.; Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 129 n.46.
132. As Kate Mitchell noted in her testimony before Congress, many have argued that
venture capitalists do not deserve to be grouped with buyout fund managers because they
purportedly invest more sweat equity. See Carried Interest Part I, supra note 13 (statement of
Kate D. Mitchell, Managing Director, Scale Venture Partners, at 9-10).
133. Depriving the fund manager of capital gains treatment on its carried interest would
mean that the ordinary investor's investment return should be taxed at the ordinary income rate.
As David Weisbach notes in his article, "[i]nvestors get capital gains and losses on their stock
sales, and we make no effort to isolate the labor component of their gains .... Weisbach,
supra note 25, at 507. Weisbach argues that the tax law does not provide a reason to tax a fund
manager differently because he or she uses limited partnership interests as a financing vehicle
rather than engaging in investment activity directly. See Weisbach, id. at 508.
134. As Jack S. Levin noted in his testimony before Congress:
[Tlhe Code does not make, and never has made, the absence or presence of
activity and ingenuity ... the test for long-term capital gain .... Just because
some private equity investors... make substantial amounts of money doesn't
mean it is in America's best interests to impose tax penalties on them without
carefully examining the macro-economic ramifications.
Fair and Equitable, supra note 67 (statement of Jack S. Levin, Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP).
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The negative repercussions of the recent economic downturn on private equity deal-
making lend support to the argument that carried interests cannot be likened to a
guaranteed form of payment. A recent Private Equity Analyst-Holt Compensation
Study revealed that the ongoing credit crisis would negatively impact carried interest
distributions for 2008.135 Indeed, firms that acquired companies with the hope of
selling them for a profit have faced a difficult exit market. 36 Much of the debate that
ensued in 2007 focused on leveling the playing field between investment fund partners,
corporate executives, and other individuals whose annual compensation is subject to
ordinary income rates.137 However, taxing carried interest at ordinary income rates
would not reflect the reality of the economic relationship between the general partner
and the limited partner of a private equity or venture capital partnership.'
38
2. The Loan Approach
The strongest existing tax law analogy likens a general partner's carried interest to
an equal nonrecourse, interest-free demand loan of the same amount of the capital
managed by the general partner, which is then invested in the fund.' 39 A nonrecourse
loan prevents the lender from reaching the borrower's personal assets if the loan is not
repaid. 140 The general partner agrees to the carried interest percentage that it will
receive upon the sale of the portfolio company at the outset of the investment when the
limited partners commit capital to the fund.' 4' If the general partner's investments are
not profitable, the limited partners cannot attach the general partners' personal assets
and must bear the burden of the loss. Consider Victor Fleischer's example in 'Two and
Twenty":
[I]magine a $100 million fund that appreciates to $150 million over three years.
The GP would receive $10 million, or twenty percent of the $50 million in profits.
Now, imagine that instead of a twenty percent profits interest, the LPs made the
GP a $20 million loan. The loan would be made nonrecourse on the condition that
135. See Pay Rises and Performance Falls for Private Equity Managers, Posting of Claire
Cain Miller to N.Y Times' Bits Blog, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09103/pay-rises-
and-performance-falls-for-private-equity-managers/?scp=l &sq=Pay/o2ORises%20and%20
Performance°%2OFalls%20for/o20Private%2OEquity/o20Managers&st=cse (Sept. 3, 2008,
16:43 EST).
136. See Thomas Heath, Private Equity's Loss of Leverage: Credit Crunch Puts Brakes on
Buyout Blitz, Forces Firms to Change Direction, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2008, at D08 (discussing
losses evident at beginning of 2008); Pay Rises and Performance Falls for Private Equity
A&tdagers, supra note 135.
137. See ARON-DINE, supra note 5, at 2, 8.
138. As David Weisbach notes, the arbitrary distinctions made in recent tax reform proposals
would encourage investment fund general partners to restructure their existing financial
arrangements to avoid paying ordinary income tax rates. See Weisbach, supra note 25, at 505.
139. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 30-40 (describing the "Accrual Income Tax
Alternative"); Leo Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let
Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAx L. REv. 287,302 n.92 (1992). But see Weisbach, supra
note 25, at 509-10 (critiquing the approach advocated by Fleischer and Schmolka).
140. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 40 n.163 (describing nonrecourse loans).
141. See id. at 40.
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the loan proceeds are invested in the fund. The fund would appreciate to $150
million, making the GP's share worth $30 million. The GP then pays back the $20
million, leaving it with $10 million, the same as if it had received the profits
interest in the first place.1
42
Under the "loan approach," the inherent unfairness of a lower tax rate on carried
interest lies with the general partner's ability to borrow a portion of the limited
partner's capital without paying annual loan interest. 143 Critics of carried interest
legislation contend that if carried interests were taxed at ordinary income rates, the
general partners could simply restructure the limited partnership investment as a
nonrecourse loan.144 If the general partners modified their partnership agreements to
reflect this change, these critics argue that general partner profits would again be taxed
at the preferential rate of fifteen percent. 45 With limited partner investments now
recast as a loan to the general partner, the carried interest would more closely resemble
a gain on capital contributed by the general partner.
146
While a carried interest is certainly analogous to a nonrecourse loan, converting the
general partner's profits interest into a loan would produce undesirable consequences
for the limited partner under the current tax law. If the carried interest is converted into
a loan on twenty percent of the capital contributed, the limited partner would bear the
burden of the forgone interest payments. 147 To prevent "disguised compensation," a
loan that is given with a low interest rate or no interest rate at all has an imputed
interest equivalent to the applicable federal rate. 48 For tax purposes, the limited
partner "lender" would be deemed to have received annual payments on the loan's
interest, and would consequently face a tax liability while the general partner would be
entitled to a corresponding tax deduction for the imputed payments. 49 Therefore, while
142. Id.
143. See id. at 40-41.
144. See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 136; Fleischer, supra note 23, at 57; see
also Weisbach, supra note 25, at 507 n.9 (discussing how carried interest can be restated as a
nonrecourse loan that paid a fixed eight percent interest rate).
145. See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 68. Lawyers have recently advised fund
managers to convert their carried interest fees into loans to avoid potentially higher taxes. See
Donmoyer & Wee, supra note 10.
146. Regardless of whether Congress ultimately chooses to treat carried interest as ordinary
income, fund managers have the ability to engage in avoidance measures because they have
complete control over their compensation agreements and can modify their contractual
provisions in response to changes in the tax law. See Sheppard, supra note 11, at 1241.
147. The mechanics of I.R.C. § 7872, the provision applicable to below-market loans, are
discussed at length in John A. Lynch Jr., Taxation of Below-Market Loans Under §7872: This
Could Be a Lot Simpler!, 21 AKRON TAX J. 33, 35-38 (2006). Basically, if the limited partner
were to loan investment capital to the general partner without charging interest, the transaction
would be treated as if the limited partner loaned the general partner the amount of the loan
proceeds at the "statutorily designated rate," and the general partner transferred this designated
rate to the limited partner. See id. at 35.
148. See I.R.C. § 7872(a), (f) (2006); Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.7872-3(b)(4), 50 Fed. Reg. 33,553
(Aug. 20, 1985).
149. See Cunningham & Engler, supra note 23, at 130.
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a carried interest ostensibly resembles a loan, the consequence of treating it as one
could drastically alter the underlying economics of the fund partnership.
3. A Modified "Cost-of-Capital" Approach
While a carried interest and a nonrecourse loan are not interchangeable, a carried
interest's loan-like attributes provide a constructive approach to resolving the
perceived unfairness of taxing carried interest as a capital gain. Victor Fleischer has
suggested that, in light of a carried interest's resemblance to a nonrecourse loan, the
fairest way to tax carried interest would be to recognize the fact that it falls somewhere
"in between ordinary income and capital gain."'' 50 In his "cost-of-capital" approach,
Fleischer suggests that taxing the general partner's implicitly forgiven loan interest at
ordinary income rates would accurately reflect the economics of the transaction
between the general partners and the limited partners and result in a net gain to the
Treasury. 15 1
Fleischer's theory operates in the context of a private equity fund in which a limited
partner that is tax-exempt, a status that is applicable to a majority of private equity
limited partners, 152 provides a general partner with the benefit of tax-free capital. The
limited partners are theoretically entitled to a deduction because they are bearing the
cost of this benefit to the general partners. In his article, Fleischer posits that in a fund
with a $95 million contribution from the limited partners, the general partner would be
taxed on eight percent, the cost of capital, multiplied by the general partner's twenty
percent profits interest, multiplied by the source of capital outside of the general
partner's contribution, multiplied by a thirty-five percent rate.153 In his hypothetical,
this amount is equivalent to $532,000. The limited partners would be allocated a
$532,000 deduction in accordance with their capital interests, and their tax-exempt
status would result in a net revenue gain to the Treasury. 154 If the arrangement were
applied in the context of a taxable limited partner, the tax benefit to the general partner
would be offset by the loss of a tax benefit to the limited partner, and there would not
be a net revenue gain.'
55
Fleischer's theory would be difficult to implement in the form of a legislative
enactment. For instance, the applicable Federal Rate used to impute interest does not
accurately reflect the risk of fund investments.156 The applicable Federal Rate (AFR) is
a "risk-free" rate, whereas fund investments tend to be risky and bring potentially high
150. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Baucus Says Hedge-Fund Tax Bill Is 'Nowhere Close' (Update 3),
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 7, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=emailen&referhome&sid=arqIw6TMWkw.
151. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 53 & n.210.
152. See Alan D. Viard, The Taxation of Carried Interest: Understanding the Issues, 61
NAT'L TAX J. 445,457 (2008).
153. Fleischer, supra note 23, at 53 n.210. Essentially, the general partner would be
reporting income in an amount equal to the deemed loan multiplied by the cost of capital rate.
See Matthew A. Melone, Success Breeds Discontent: Reforming the Taxation of Carried
Interests-Forcing a Square Peg into a Round Hole, 46 DUQ. L. REv. 421,472 (2008).
154. Fleischer, supra note 23, at 53 n.210.
155. Id.
156. See Melone, supra note 153, at 472.
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rates of return.157 But despite the conceptual difficulties attributable to likening carried
interest to a loan, Fleischer's approach illustrates the extent to which a fund manager's
carried interest is comprised partially, rather than entirely, of ordinary income. Similar
to an ordinary investor's investment in the stock market, a fund manager's return is
sensitive to market fluctuations.15 8 Taxing a portion, rather than the entirety, of a
general partner's carried interest as ordinary income may be a way to recognize the
risks and sweat equity taken on by private equity and venture capital partners without
distorting the economics of the transaction.
III. THE PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF PUBLICLY TRADED PARTNERSHIPS
THAT QUALIFY UNDER § 7704(c)(2) 159
In addition to scrutinizing executive pay in 2007, Congress sought to prevent
publicly traded investment partnerships from structuring their IPOs and using
amorphous fee structures to avoid corporate taxation. Senate Bill 1624, also dubbed
the "Blackstone Bill," sought to amend I.R.C. § 7704(c) by providing that "the
exception from the treatment of publicly traded partnerships as corporations for
partnerships with passive-type income shall not apply to partnerships directly or
indirectly deriving income from providing investment adviser and related asset
management services.' 6' The Senate bill attempted to thwart attempts by publicly
traded partnerships to "act like a corporation" by professing to be engaged in active
business services "but not pay corporate tax."1
61
157. PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 62.
158. See, e.g., Jason Kelly, Schwarzman's Pay Falls 99% Amid Blackstone Losses, Stock
Drop, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aBSbs77HhdSk (noting that
Blackstone's Steve Schwarzman took a ninety-nine percent pay cut after the firm posted losses
in excess of $1 billion). The article also notes that "[i]nvestment profits have virtually
evaporated as credit markets prevent private equity firms from buying new companies or selling
their existing holdings to other private buyers." Id. George Roberts, co-founder of the Kohlberg
Kravis & Roberts Co. private equity firm, has observed, "No longer can you sit by, use the
capital markets, put some leverage on a company and hope to make a good return. Those days
are over with." He also said that the global financial crisis has resulted in his firm's first loss in
nearly two decades. Lisa LaMotta, KKR's Roberts Reflects, FORBES.COM, Nov. 17, 2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/l 1/17/roberts-kkr-credit-face-markets-
cx lal 11 13autofacescan02.html.
159. "A partnership meets the gross income requirements of this paragraph for any taxable
year if 90 percent or more of the gross income of such partnership for such taxable year consists
of qualifying income." I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (2006). A partnership that qualifies under this
provision is not treated as a corporation for tax purposes when it decides to go public.
Otherwise, per I.R.C. § 7704(a), "[A] publicly traded partnership shall be treated as a
corporation." I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006).
160. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007). The services referred to are those provided by a person as
an investment adviser as defined in section 202 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 15
U.S.C. 80b-2 (2006). See also PRESENT LAw AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 41.
161. Committee on Finance News Release, supra note 1, at ]. It is worth noting that the IPO
prospectuses of both Fortress and Blackstone described their activities as active. See, e.g.,
Blackstone Group L.P., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Amendment
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The bill was largely a response to the way in which alternative asset manager
Blackstone structured its initial public stock offering.162 If the bill is revisited under the
new presidential administration, its passage into law would be fair and consistent with
the tax code. In contrast to the Levin Bill, which presents an overly punitive response
to lucrative executive pay structures, the Blackstone Bill aptly forecloses unintended
tax benefits for a private partnership that becomes a public entity.
A. Current Law and the Blackstone Bill
The current form of I.R.C. § 7704 was initiated by the House Ways and Means
Committee in 1987, and its intent was largely to "preserve the corporate level tax."'
163
The Committee's concern that the publicly traded partnership form was growing in
popularity because parties could "tak[e] advantage of an unintended opportunity for
disincorporation and elective integration of the corporate and shareholder levels."'
' 6
While pass-through taxation rules do not generally apply to publicly traded
partnerships, the ease with which Blackstone and Fortress structured their IPOs to
qualify for preferential tax treatment reignited those same concerns over erosion of the
corporate tax base.'
65
When Fortress initiated the process to make its private investment partnership
public in November 2006, the event was hardly controversial. 166 However, as the first
U.S.-based hedge fund to go public, Fortress paved the way for similarly situated firms,
such as Blackstone, to benefit from preferential partnership tax treatment while
dodging regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 167 The tax lawyers
who assisted Fortress executed a bold plan that revealed a fundamental problem with
the current tax treatment of carried interest. 168 Investment management partners that
choose to take their management companies public are permitted to perform active
No. 2 to Form S-I) (May 21, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/000104746907004475/a2177304zs-l a.htm;
Fortress Inv. Group LLC, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Amendment
No. 4 to Form S-I) (Feb. 2, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1380393/000095013607000635/filel .htm.
162. Despite the upheaval following the Blackstone IPO because of its perceived
profitability, the economic decline that followed the IPO resulted in negative consequences for
Blackstone general partners and investors. As of March 2008, its stock price had dropped more
than fifty percent from its IPO value. See de la Merced, supra note 106. As of November 2008,
its stock price had dropped more than seventy-five percent from its IPO value. Blackstone Posts
$502.5 Million Loss, N.Y Times' DealBook Blog,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/blackstone-loses-5025-million-in-3rd-quarter/
(Nov. 6, 2008, 8:41 EST).
163. Committee on Finance News Release, supra note 1, at 3.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 3-4.
166. See Beck, supra note 11, at 94.
167. Whereas a partnership is only taxed on income that flows to the partners, a corporation
is taxed on the income that it earns, and is taxed again at the shareholder level when the
shareholders receive dividends. See id. at 97; Alex Halperin, Investors Storm Fortress IPO,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM., Feb. 9, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/feb2007/pi20070209_895342.htm.
168. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 104.
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services 69 as defined by the Investment Company Act of 1940,170 while their income
remains passive-and taxed at the lower capital gains rate-under I.R.C. § 7704.171
And since the services undertaken by Fortress superficially bear a strong resemblance
to those provided by publicly traded corporations registered under the Investment
Company Act that pay the corporate tax rate, the firm has a significant, unfair
competitive advantage over those competitors, such as Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
72
As Susan Beck has noted, Blackstone's IPO was bolder than that of Fortress.
173
Unlike Fortress, which went public as a limited liability company, Blackstone went
public as a limited partnership, which enabled it to avoid several corporate governance
requirements. 74 The unconventionally tax-friendly structure of its IPO troubled tax
scholars and policymakers for several reasons.
169. See, e.g., Richard Teitelbaum, The KKR Way, BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Aug. 2007, at 36,
37-38 (discussing how private equity firm KKR has successfully purchased and turned around
several companies by hiring consultants and assigning its own executives to serve on the board
of directors). While carried interest technically constitutes passive income, the responsibilities
undertaken by private equity general partners can hardly be considered passive.
170. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2006).
171. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 102-04 (describing the mechanics of this phenomenon
and accusing entities of exploiting arbitrage opportunities between the tax code and the
Investment Company Act). It is believed that fund managers structure the publicly traded entity
to avoid becoming a registered investment company and consequently maintain the ability to
leverage transactions with debt, make risky investments, and allow fund managers to profit
directly from the fund's investment return. See Ordower, supra note 65, at 333.
172. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 92; Beck, supra note 11, at 97; Donmoyer, supra note
150. Blackstone and Goldman Sachs perform similar investment functions but Goldman Sachs
recently paid $1.1 billion in corporate income taxes on its $3.4 billion second-quarter profits,
whereas Blackstone Group only paid $14 million on its first-quarter earnings of $ 1.1 billion. See
Weiner, supra note 7, at 315.
173. See Beck, supra note 11, at 94.
174. Id. at 98-99; Fleischer, supra note 11, at 95. As Susan Beck noted, Blackstone saved its
partners billions of dollars in taxes. Beck, supra note 11, at 98. In the wake of the Blackstone
IPO, several privately regulated entities started making arrangements to take their firms public
to be grandfathered in under the existing rules. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Will Blackstone Have
the Honor of Its Own Tax Law?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 2007, § 3, at 7; Miles Weiss, Fidelity
Reorganizes; Move May Eliminate U.S. Taxes (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 2, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aRRYyU4PiOSc&refer=home.
Despite the fact that Blackstone announced a third-quarter loss of$113 million, or 44 cents a
share, in 2007, Kohlberg Kravis & Roberts Co. (KKR), Och-Ziff Capital Management, and
AQR Capital Management were still interested in taking their hedge funds and private equity
funds public. Turning over the Rock, Commentary: Blackstone 's Loss Brings Public Pressure,
MARKETWATCH, Nov. 12, 2007,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/blackstones-naked-loss-another-
fnrst/story.aspx?guid={E 1 C41AC4-BC70-47F8-8AF1-ADE074AB5D7A}&dist=msr_ 1. While
the Blackstone IPO was the sixth richest IP0 in U.S. history, raising $4.13 billion, it suffered
losses late in 2007 due to IPO costs. Dana Cimilluca & Kaja Whitehouse, Blackstone's Twin
Hits: IPO Costs, M&A Drought, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007, at C3. In late 2007 and early 2008,
declining stock prices and market conditions persuaded KKR to abandon its IPO plans. See
LaMotta, supra note 158.
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First, the structure illustrated how an investment management partnership could
reap substantial tax benefits by transferring $3.7 billion in goodwill-the value of its
intangible assets-to offset a significant amount of its management fee income. 175 The
Blackstone partners transferred the goodwill to a blocker corporation that it created. 
7 6
In addition, the general partners used the blocker corporation as a depository for the
partnership's personal service income. 77 Since goodwill presumably depreciates over
time, 178 Blackstone's general partners can deduct approximately $1.3 billion in taxes,
equivalent to thirty-five percent of the value of its goodwill, 179 from its personal service
income over a period of fifteen years.18 0 The blocker corporation effectively "blocks"
personal service income from the partnership. Without the personal service income,
Blackstone can qualify under the narrow exception provided in § 7704(c)(2), which
permits it to avoid treatment as a corporation for tax purposes.' 8
Second, the Blackstone general partners provided for a lucrative Tax Receivable
Agreement in the partnership's prospectus.' 82 Under the Agreement, Blackstone's
investors are able to receive fifteen percent of the goodwill deduction while the
partners are entitled to the remaining eighty-five percent, which is approximately $1.1
billion.' 83 The eighty-five percent cash savings achieved through the Tax Receivable
Agreement result from increases in the tax basis of Blackstone's two subsidiaries,
Blackstone Holdings l1lI GP and Blackstone Holdings V GP.
184
Third, Blackstone was able to maintain favorable tax treatment in its IPO despite its
ostensible use of related entities.185 Under the current tax law, a corporation may
deduct depreciation or amortization on property that has been purchased, 86 but
ordinary income will result from the sale of depreciable assets that would otherwise
result in a capital gain to the seller if the sale is executed between parties that are
directly or indirectly related.187 Since the managing entity did not maintain fifty percent
175. See PREsENT LAW AND ANALYsIS PART I, supra note 14, at 52 n.111.
176. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2007, at Al. The shell corporation is referred to as a "blocker corporation"
because it is said to block taxes from reaching the Treasury. Beck describes it as "[a]
corporation created as a subsidiary to a publicly traded partnership that takes nonqualifying fee
income and turns it into qualifying dividend income." Beck, supra note 11, at 97.
177. See Beck, supra note 11, at 98.
178. See Johnston, supra note 176.
179. This figure is based on the corporate tax rate for depreciation. See Johnston, supra note
176.
180. See Sheppard, supra note 11, at 1241-42.
181. See PREsENT LAW AND ANALYSIS PART I, supra note 14, at 40. Since Blackstone
qualifies under I.R.C. § 7702(b), it paid taxes on the $3.7 billion at the fifteen percent capital
gains rate rather than the thirty-five percent corporate tax rate.
182. See id. at 1241-43.
183. Johnston, supra note 176.
184. Id. at 1242.
185. See id.
186. I.R.C. § 167 (2006).
187. See I.R.C. § 1239 (2006). In other words, if the person transferring assets to the
partnership or a related person owns more than fifty percent of the acquirer, the gain that is
recognized is ordinary income and will be taxed at a rate up to thirty-five percent. Timothy J.
Devetski, Practice Note: Avoiding a Tax-Free Transaction: When Taxable Is Tax-Efficient, 5
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of the company's value and merely maintained voting control, 188 it was exempt from
the definition of "related persons" and consequently did not have to pay the applicable
corporate tax rate.I8 9 Under the Tax Receivable Agreement, the annual payments to
Blackstone's current owners and managers are expected to be between $40 million and
$90 million, and these payments will be made regardless of whether the owners
continue to own the enterprise.1
90
B. The Blackstone Bill and the Carried Interest Debate, Generally
The Blackstone IPO reveals the difficulty of confining a carried interest to being
either ordinary income or a capital gain in a rapidly changing business landscape. As
Lee Sheppard notes, "[fund managers] have figured out how to turn paying taxes into
an annuity."'' "[T]ax experts mix and match elements of partnerships and
corporations, and bits and pieces of the tax code, securities laws, accounting rules and
economic principles."' 192 The Blackstone Bill had "independent merit as a matter of
protecting the integrity of the tax system"'193 because it prevented investment fund
general partners from exploiting the passive status of carried interest. In the specific
context of publicly traded partnerships, it was an aptly drafted solution to an
unintended tax loophole.
CONCLUSION
Treating publicly traded partnerships as corporations for tax purposes would be
consistent with the Internal Revenue Code. However, it is not clear that taxing carried
interest at ordinary income rates would be similarly consistent. A majority of the
arguments in favor of taxing carried interest at ordinary income rates have attempted to
posit an analogy between the labor of fund managers and the labor of employees whose
profits are taxed at ordinary income rates. However, as David Weisbach notes, the
presence of labor alone cannot justify a drastic change in the taxation of fund manager
profits.' 94 Justifying the tax increase on the grounds of labor alone would leave ample
room for investment fund partnerships to engage in tax avoidance by restructuring their
existing financial arrangements, and perhaps even coining new terms of art to disguise
the true nature of their business transactions.
195
Blackstone's IPO illustrated the ease with which investment management
partnerships can benefit from identifying wrinkles in the tax code and engaging in tax
avoidance that the law seeks to prevent. As Fleischer notes, the Blackstone Bill is a
step in the right direction because it targets a specific avoidance strategy in a specific
context. 196 However, articulating the appropriate policy approach to taxing private
Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 90, 93 (2005).
188. See I.R.C. § 1239(c) (2006) (defining controlled entity).
189. See id. § 1239(b).
190. Sheppard, supra note 11, at 1242.
191. Johnston, supra note 176 (quoting Lee Sheppard).
192. Id.
193. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 114.
194. See Weisbach, supra note 25, at 505.
195. See id.
196. See Fleischer, supra note 11, at 114 (noting that the bill has independent merit as a
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investment partnership carried interests requires recognizing that at least a portion of a
fund manager's duties entail investing capital in an uncertain market-an activity that
the current statutory regime taxes at a preferential tax rate. The cost-of-capital
approach introduced by Victor Fleischer 97 most closely approximates a reasonable tax
reform that will minimize tax avoidance strategies and maintain consistency in the
Code. Indeed, the tax code must keep up with the times, and consequently Congress
should adopt a tax policy approach that suits the complex nature of the investment
partnership fund fee structure.
matter of protecting the integrity of the tax system).
197. See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 52-54.
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